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Do International Labor Standards Contribute to the 
Persistence of the Child Labor Problem?
*
 
In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried 
to discourage the use of child labor in poor countries through measures such as product 
boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such 
measures is to reduce the incidence of child labor in developing countries and thereby 
improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a 
political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child labor 
tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child labor. 
Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication 
of child labor. 
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The use of child labor in developing countries is a contentious political issue
within industrialized countries. For example, consumer groups run publicity
campaigns or product boycotts to put pressure on businesses that use child labor
in developing countries. These campaigns protest the use of “sweatshop” labor
by various corporations and promote “fair trade” labels for agricultural goods
and handicrafts. At the level of governments and international organizations,
there are calls for the imposition and strict enforcement of international labor
standards. These measures could subject countries using child labor in export
industries to severe trade sanctions. The issue of labor standards recently has
become a major point of dispute between rich and poor countries in international
trade negotiations.
For some time, economists have questioned the wisdom of measures like prod-
uct boycotts and international labor standards. A recurring argument is that the
ultimate cause of child labor is poverty. Given that boycotts and sanctions tend
to lower the export earnings of developing countries at least in the short run, av-
erage income may fall even further, increasing the need of poor families to rely
on child labor. In other words, even if international action succeeds in displacing
children from export industries, more children may end up working.1
While raising serious concerns, this argument alone does not imply that trade
policies are ineffective at reducing child labor in the long term. Countries that
have eradicated child labor usually have done so primarily through imposing
and strictly enforcing policies such as minimum-age laws for employment and
compulsory schooling. This observation suggests that the ultimate solution for
the child labor problem lies in domestic political action within developing coun-
tries. So, if we want to assess the long-run effect of trade policies aimed at reduc-
ing child labor, we need to ask how such policies affect the likelihood of further
political reform within developing countries. Even if trade policies have detri-
mental short-run effects, they could still be worthwhile options if, by triggering
1See for example Edmonds (2008), who reports evidence for a case involving the Bangladeshi
garment industry. Similarly, Basu and Zarghamee (2008) argues from a theoretical perspective
that boycotts and trade sanctions may increase child labor.
1domestic political action, they contribute to the long-run eradication of child la-
bor.
At ﬁrst sight, policies such as trade sanctions and product boycotts might seem
to improve the prospect for political reform in developing countries. Given that
such policies reduce the wages of working children, they diminish the impor-
tance of child labor as a source of income for families. Thus, such policies might
be thought to weaken the opposition to measures such as a complete ban on
child labor or strictly enforced compulsory schooling. Put differently, interna-
tional trade policies might nudge developing countries towards adopting mea-
sures that erase child labor entirely.
This paper shows that this intuition, however plausible, is likely to be wrong. We
build on the analysis of the political economy of child-labor laws in Doepke and
Zilibotti (2005). In that paper, we argue that opposition to child-labor regulation
stems not only from employers who beneﬁt from an abundant supply of cheap
labor, but also from poor families for whom child labor is a necessary source of
ﬁnancial support. In contrast, the constituency in favor of child-labor regulation
consists of unskilled workers who compete with children in the labor market, but
who do not depend on child labor themselves, because their own children go to
school.
From the perspective of this theory, if we want to evaluate the long-run impact
of policy interventions we must assess how trade-policy measures imposed by
foreign countries change the substitution relationships between adult and child
labor, and how they affect the incentives for education. To do so, we assume that
the local government can choose between a laissez faire (LF) policy, under which
child labor is legal, and a child-labor ban (B), under which child labor is ruled out
in all sectors. The international community has the option of imposing interna-
tional labor standards (IS) on the country, which prevents the use of child labor
in the export sector, but not in ﬁrms producing for the domestic market. The
focus of our analysis is to determine how workers’ political preferences regard-
ing a child-labor ban depend on whether the international community imposes
international labor standards.
Our main ﬁnding is that that the imposition of IS generally lowers domestic po-
2litical support for the introduction of the ban B, and may prevent the ultimate
eradication of child labor. Imposing IS reduces competition between unskilled
adults and children in the labor market, thereby weakening the incentives for
adult workers to support a child-labor ban.
In our model, children supply unskilled labor and thus are potential competitors
of adult unskilled workers. However, there are different types of unskilled la-
bor, and adults have a comparative advantage in the most physically demanding
tasks. We envision the export sector in our model economy as a manufacturing
sector in which children and adults carry out similar tasks, and thus compete
with each other in the labor market. As long as children work in the export sec-
tor, unskilled workers have an incentive to support a ban of child labor, because
the ban would reduce competition and raise adult wages.
If now IS are imposed on the country, children are displaced from the export sec-
tor and have to work in the domestic sector. We interpret the domestic sector as
representing mostly traditional, family-based agriculture. In this sector, there are
unskilledtasks (suchasheavyﬁeldwork)inwhichadultshaveacomparative ad-
vantage, and others (such as tending small animals) in which adults and children
are equally efﬁcient. Once IS are in place, adults and children specialize in the
unskilled tasks in which they have a comparative advantage. As a consequence,
adult and child workers in the domestic sector are not in direct competition, but
rather are complementary to each other. As a consequence, unskilled workers
may no longer have an incentive to support a ban of child labor.
Whetherthe softening of competition between adultsand children resulting from
the imposition of IS is enough to prevent a ban on child labor depends on the ex-
act substitution relationships between adult and child labor. However, in our
model the direction of the effect is clear cut: as long as IS are binding, impos-
ing them always reduces unskilled workers’ ﬁnancial incentives for supporting
a child labor ban.
Asecondchannelthrough which IScanaffectthe political economyofchild-labor
regulation derives from the effect on education. If IS were to induce more par-
ents to educate their children, fewer families would be economically dependent
on child labor, which could strengthen the constituency in favor of a child-labor
3ban in the long run. While this possibility does arise in our analysis, it is unlikely
that the effect would be strong enough to revert the direct ﬁnancial incentives.
Moreover, our theory abstracts from income effects that would play against the
increase in education. The recent empirical literature argues that such income
effects are important, and that measures (such as IS) that worsen poverty in fam-
ilies relying on child labor are unlikely to induce these families to send more of
their children to school.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that the imposition of IS generally lowers domestic polit-
ical support for a child labor ban, and in this way may contribute to the per-
sistence of the child-labor problem. For developing countries where political
support for a child-labor ban is low to begin with, this problem may seem less
relevant. But even in countries that were able to eradicate child labor, political
support for banning child labor grew only gradually over time. In Doepke and
Zilibotti (2005), we interpret the growth in support as driven by technological
change that gradually increases the demand for skilled labor, which, in turn, in-
duces more and more parents to educate their children, broadening the coalition
in favor of child-labor regulation.
To capture the dynamic effects of imposing IS in such a context, we simulate a
quantitative version of our model in which technological change increases the
demand for skilled workers in the export sector. The economy starts out in an
equilibrium in which political support for child labor regulation is weak. If there
is no international intervention, the increase in the return to education ultimately
triggers a ban on child labor. If, in contrast, IS are imposed on the economy,
sufﬁcient political support for B never materializes. Hence, IS lead to more child
labor (and lower unskilled wages) in the long run.
There is a sizeable literature on international labor standards.2 A major part of
this literature focuses on possible rationalizations for imposing restrictions on
the use of child labor in developing countries. One reason why rich countries
(i.e., countries where few or no children are working) might want to impose la-
bor standards on other countries is protectionism. If poor countries are no longer
able to use child labor their labor costs increase, which could be beneﬁcial for un-
2The edited volume Basu et al. (2003) provides an excellent overview of this literature.
4skilled workers in rich countries. Put differently, labor standards (e.g. laws reg-
ulating child labor) would rob labor-rich countries of comparative advantage by
increasing their labor costs. However, the existing empirical evidence suggests
that this channel is unlikely to be important, i.e., labor standards don’t seem to
have a large effect on comparative advantage (see for example Rodrik 1996).3
Another commonly cited justiﬁcation for imposing international labor standards
is humanitarian concern for the working children and their families (Brown,
Deardorff, and Stern 2003). Harmonized standards may help poor countries
avoid a race to the bottom in which countries attract business by lowering their
labor standards (see for example the discussion in Basu 1999). By harmonizing
labor standards poor countries may be able to restrict the global supply of un-
skilled labor, raise wages, and more generally, improve the welfare of labor-rich
countries (see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 1996).4
The humanitarian argument is called into question, though, by a number of theo-
retical and empirical studies showing that labor standards have unintended con-
sequences and may fail to reduce the use of child labor. The typical channel
is an income effect: instead of inducing poor families to send their children to
school, punitive policies may impoverish families further, forcing them to send
even more of their children to work to provide for their most basic needs.5 Re-
sults of this kind have been demonstrated for a number of different policies that
are aimed at addressing child labor.6
3There is also a lack of direct evidence that the imposition of labor standards is motivated by
protectionism. Krueger (1996) analyzes the support for labor standards in the U.S. Congress, and
ﬁnds that legislators from districts with many unskilled workers are less likely to vote for them.
If labor standards were imposed to protect unskilled workers in the United States, we would
expect to observe the opposite.
4A similar argument has been made by Basu and Van (1998) as a rationale for domestic child-
labor regulation in a closed economy.
5See Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005a)for a survey of the empirical literature that documents the
link between poverty and child labor. Using micro data from Vietnam, Edmonds and Pavcnik
(2005b) show that low prices for rice (which indicate low wages for child workers) are associated
with higher child labor rates. If this result generalizes, punitive trade sanctions on exports of
countries that use child labor are unlikely to reduce child labor. Consistent with this result, Ed-
monds and Pavcnik (2006)show that countries that trade more have less child labor. This ﬁnding
arises mainly due to the positive association between trade and income: controlling for income,
there is no robust link between trade and child labor.
6Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) focus on trade sanctions, Basu (2005) analyzes ﬁnes on the use of
5Our work complements this literature by focusing on the political-economy im-
plications of international sanctions. In particular, while the existing literature
focuses on the short-run effects of these policies, the approach of this paper is to
assess long-run implications through changes in local institutions. In this way,
our paper is connected to a recent literature on the distributional implications of
child labor regulation and on rising demand for human capital as a trigger of
political reform in the course of development.7
In the next section, we introduce the model economy. In Section 2, we derive the
economic implications of different political regimes, and examine the political
incentives for the different groups to support each regime. Section 3.3 is con-
cerned with the dynamic implications of the imposition of labor standards in an
economy undergoing technical change that reduces the demand for child labor.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are contained in the mathematical appendix.
2 The Economic Environment
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of people who live
for two periods, ﬁrst as children, and then as adults. Every adult has one child.
Children may either work or go to school. Children who go to school do not
work, and the educational cost is paid by their parents. We assume that it is
less costly for skilled adults to educate their children, because some skills are
transmitted directly within the family. The education cost for skilled families is
denoted as pS, and unskilled families face an education cost of pU > pS.
Adults can be either skilled or unskilled workers. The skill level is endogenous
and is determined by an education investment made by parents. The education
child labor, Basuand Zarghamee(2008)andDavies (2005)analyzeconsumer boycotts of products
manufacturedusing child labor, and Basu, Chau, and Grote (2006)and Baland and Duprez (2007)
examine the effectiveness of labels that certify certain products as free of child labor.
7See Krueger and Donahue (2005) and Doepke and Krueger (2006) for analyses of child labor
regulation in economies with heterogeneous agents. Galor and Moav (2006) study how rising
demand for human capital can lead to the introduction of publicly ﬁnanced education, Doepke
and Zilibotti (2005) and Dessy and Knowles (2008) analyze the political economy of child labor
in a closed-economy setting, and Doepke and Tertilt (2009) link the demand for human capital to
the expansion of women’s rights.
6technology has a stochastic return: children who do not go to school turn skilled
with probability π0, whereas for children who do go to school the probability is
π1 > π0. We denote the education choice by e ∈ {0,1}, where e = 1 corresponds
to school and e = 0 to child labor. Parents are altruistic, and weigh the potential
earnings from child labor against the additional utility their children can derive




{c + z (πeV
′
S + (1 − πe)V
′
U)},
where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint
c + phe ≤ wh + (1 − e)wC.
Here wh is the wage for skill level h, wC is the wage for working children, e
denotes the education decision, and z ∈ (0,1) is the altruism factor. Note that
when e = 1 the child implies a ﬁnancial burden for the family, whereas when
e = 0 the child brings a wage income to the family. For simplicity, we assume
that children do not consume.
The production side consists of two sectors. The output of the domestic sector
D is consumed locally, whereas the output of the export sector E is exported
and exchanged one-for-one with an import good I. Goods D and I are perfect
substitutes in consumption, which impliesthat the relative price of the two goods
is equal to one.
Three types of labor inputs are used in production: skilled labor, heavy unskilled
labor, and light unskilled labor. Skilled labor can be performed only by skilled
adults. Skilled adults are also able to perform either type of unskilled labor.
Heavy and light labor are distinguished by the importance of physical strength.
Unskilled adults can perform both types of unskilled labor, whereas children are
restricted to light unskilled labor.8 The production function of the export sector











8The qualitative results would be unchanged if we assumed that children can also perform
heavy labor, but have a comparative advantage at light labor.














Here G is a function that aggregates the two labor inputs. We assume that F E,
F D, and G exhibit constant returns to scale and decreasing marginal returns to
each factor.
The model could be extended to employ also heavy unskilled labor in the export
sector. However, our interpretation is that the export sector is industrialized, so
that physical labor is provided mostly by machines. In contrast, the domestic
sector is interpreted as traditional agriculture. Thus, heavy labor includes phys-
ically demanding work in the ﬁelds, whereas light labor in this sector includes
tasks such as weeding and tending to small animals.
Working children are perfect substitutes for adults doing light unskilled work,
but they are relatively less productive. In particular, λ < 1 denotes the physi-
cal efﬁciency of children relative to unskilled adults in providing light unskilled
labor. The actual efﬁciency λE and λD in the two sectors can be constrained addi-
tionally through government policy. In a laissez faire (LF) equilibrium, we have
λE = λD = λ. We consider two other policy options in addition to LF. One possi-
bility is that the international community imposes international labor standards
(IS) on the country. This means that foreign countries will not buy any export
goods that have been produced using child labor. However, children can still
be used in the domestic sector, over which the international community has no
direct control. The IS policy therefore amounts to setting λE = 0, while we still
have λD = λ. The ﬁnal policy option is a domestic child labor ban (B). Since this
policy is passed by the domestic government, it affects all sectors of the economy,
and consequently amounts to setting λE = λD = 0.
We use θU,D and θU,E to denote the fraction of adult unskilled labor employed in
light labor in the domestic and export sectors, respectively, with the remainder
employed for heavy labor in the domestic sector. Similarly, θC,E denotes the frac-
tion of child labor employed in the export sector, with the remainder employed
in the domestic sector. Using this notation, for a given number of adult workers













h = (1 − θU,E − θU,D)NU.









Since we assume competitive production, under any policy regime wages are
givenbymarginalproducts. However, thepolicyregimesstill affectwagesthrough
restrictions on labor supply.
3 WageDeterminationandPoliticalIncentivesunder
Alternative Policy Regimes
In thissection we analyze political economy of child-labor regulation in our econ-
omy. The focal point of the analysis is how the imposition of IS affects the incen-
tive of certain groups—in particular, unskilled workers—for supporting a child
labor ban. We start by examining the impact of the different policies on wages.
We will show that if the initial policy regime is LF, the introduction of a child la-
bor ban raises unskilled wages, which gives unskilled workers a motive to sup-
port the ban. In contrast, if IS are already in place, the introduction of B leads
to a smaller rise or even a decline in unskilled wages. This result suggests that
the imposition of IS may lower the political support for B. However, political
preferences depend not only on the impact effect, but also on the dynamic con-
sequences of the different policies. We therefore also analyze how each policy
affects wages, education, and labor supply in the long run.
93.1 Short-Run Wage Effects
Our ﬁrst task is to examine how wages are determined in each policy regime for
given total labor supply NS, NU, and NC. We assume the labor supply of each
group to be positive. We also focus on equilibria where both sectors are operated
in equilibrium, where it is optimal for skilled workers to specialize in supplying
skilled labor, and where adult unskilled workers supply both light and heavy
labor.9
Proposition 1 (Wages under LF) Under laissez faire (λE = λD = λ), the equilibrium
wages wLF
S , wLF
U , and wLF
C and labor allocations θLF
U,D, θLF
U,E and θLF































































































Under laissez faire, all factors are allocated to the productive sector where they
command the highest return. Given that light labor is essential in each sector
and children can supply labor to either sector, the returns to light labor have to
be equalized across sectors. The returns to light and heavy unskilled labor have
to be equalized as well, given that we focus on equilibria where adults supply
both types of unskilled labor. The equilibrium uniquely pins down the wages as
well as the total supply of each type of labor. However, the allocation of unskilled
adults and children between the two sectors is indeterminate.
We now turn to the wage structure under the imposition of international labor
standards.
9The analysis could be extended to additional cases. However, these cases would add sub-
stantially more notation without offering new insights. Later on, we will place assumptions on
parameters that ensure that these conditions are met.
10Proposition 2 (Wages under IS) For the determination of equilibrium wages under
IS (λE = 0, λD = λ) there are two possible cases.
1. The restriction of children to the domestic sector does not bind. This is the case
if in the corresponding laissez-faire equilibrium the total supply of light labor by















U , and wIS
C = wLF
C .










In this case, we have θIS
U,D = 0 (adults do not supply any light labor to the domestic






















































In the ﬁrst case, IS have no effect on wages, since the institutional constraint can
be met by reshufﬂing unskilled adults and children across the two sectors. In the
second case, the removal of children from the export sector will result in overem-
ployment of light labor in the domestic sector. Relative to laissez faire, this im-
plies that the children’s wage has to decrease, whereas the wage for unskilled
adults (who were previously competing with children in the export sector) has
to rise.
Finally, consider the wage implications of a child-labor ban.
Proposition 3 (Wages under B) Under a child-labor ban (λE = λD = 0) unskilled
adults supply light labor to both sectors, so that θB
U,E,θB
U,D > 0. The equilibrium wages


























































Under a ban, unskilled adults have to supply all unskilled labor, and conse-
quently the returns to unskilled labor are equalized across sectors and across
light and heavy labor.
We can now determine the effect of unexpected changes in the policy regime. It is
useful to distinguish between short- and long-run effects. The short-run effect of
a policy change is calculated taking as given the total labor supply of each group
in the current period.
Proposition 4 (Short-run Effects on Wages) For a given supply of adult labor and
given education decisions, the relative wages under LF, IS, and B depend on whether IS
are binding. The two cases are:




































































Notice that if IS are binding, the comparison of adult wages between IS and B
cannot be signed unambiguously. There are two counteracting effects on wages,
and the sign of the overall change depends on which effect dominates. To un-
derstand these two effects in more detail, let us start by focusing on an economy
in which IS are already in place, but are non-binding. In this case, the returns to
light and heavy labor in the domestic sector are equalized. Consider now how
wages will adjust if B is imposed. Given the removal of children from the domes-
tic sector, adult unskilled labor has to be reshufﬂed in this sector to once again
equalize the returns to light and heavy labor. Given the reduction in total un-
skilled labor supply in the sector and the presence of the ﬁxed factor land, this
implies an upshift in the unskilled wage. In response to this change, some un-
skilled labor will be reallocated from the export to the domestic sector, which
accounts for the decline in the skilled wage.
Hence, the force that tends to increase the unskilled wage when B is introduced
is the reduction in the total supply of unskilled labor, in the presence of the ﬁxed
factor land that is complementary to unskilled labor. We call this effect the labor
supply effect, since it is driven by the aggregate decline in unskilled labor. If IS
are binding, however, a second effect comes into play. In this case, under IS
the return to light labor in the domestic sector (which is supplied entirely by
children) is lower than the return to heavy labor. If B is introduced and children
are removed from the labor market, adult unskilled labor has to be reassigned to
light labor in the domestic sector. To equalizereturns to light and heavy labor, the
ratio of heavy to light labor supply has to increase in the domestic sector, which
lowers the return to heavy labor. This labor reallocation effect tends to depress the
unskilled wage.
Another way to understand the two effects is to realize that in the production
structure adult and child labor can serve both as substitutes and as complements.
13When adult and child labor are substitutes (such as when IS are non-binding and
both adults and children perform the same light tasks in the domestic sector),
only the labor supply effect is present, and the imposition of B unambiguously
increases adult unskilled wages. In contrast, when IS are binding, adult and
child labor are complementary in the domestic sector, because adults and chil-
dren perform distinct tasks (heavy and light labor). If now B is introduced, the
labor reallocation effect also arises and counteracts the labor supply effect.
Whether the labor supply effect or the labor reallocation effect dominates de-
pends on the parameters of the production function and on labor supply. Gener-
ally, the labor supply effect tends to be large if the share of land in domestic pro-
duction is large. The labor reallocation effect is large if under IS there is a big gap
between the return to heavy and light (i.e., adult and child) labor in the domestic
sector. The following proposition gives a condition under which wB
U < wIS
U (i.e.,
the labor reallocation effect dominates the labor supply effect, so that imposing
B on top of IS lowers unskilled wages) in the case of a nested Cobb Douglas-CES
technology.
Proposition 5 (Condition for wB
U < wIS
U ) Consider the case in which the export tech-





















U denote the total number of unskilled adults working in the domestic sector
under IS, and NIS
C is the corresponding number of child workers. If the condition:
(1 − b)







































14that is, the imposition of B when IS are already in place will lower unskilled wages.
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the case α > β. The condition
in Proposition 5 will then be met if NIS
C is sufﬁciently large relative to N
D,IS
U .
Intuitively, if the supply of child labor is large under IS, there is a large wedge
between the returns to light child labor and heavy adult labor. If now B is im-
posed, the child labor that complements adult labor is withdrawn, inducing a
large labor reallocation effect. As a result, the equilibrium unskilled wage falls.
Ultimately, we want to know how the imposition of IS affects domestic political
support for passing a full ban B. In our theory, the potential support for child-
labor restrictions stems from unskilled workers who would like to raise their
wages by restricting competition. Given Proposition 4, what we can say un-
ambiguously is that the introduction of IS shrinks the potential wage gains for
unskilled workers.
Corollary 1 For given aggregate adult labor supply NS and NU, the change in the un-
skilled wage following the introduction of B is smaller if the initial condition is IS com-










The inequality is strict if IS are binding, i.e., if (2) is satisﬁed. The right-hand side of (3)
is always positive, whereas the left-hand side can be positive, zero, or negative.
Thus, if IS are binding, at the very least imposing IS reduces the potential wage
gains from B for unskilled workers. If the left-hand side of (3) is negative, if IS are
in place unskilled workers would in fact suffer lower wages from an introduction
of B. These results suggest that imposing IS might lower domestic support for B.
Another factor that determines the political preferences of unskilled workers is
the loss of child labor income in the families where children are working. The
next proposition characterizes how the total income of such families depends on
the policy regime.
15Proposition 6 (Short-run Effects on Family Income) Forfamilieswhosechildrenre-
ceive education, family income is given by the adult wage, which is characterized in
Proposition 4 above. For unskilled familieswith working children, family income is given
by wU + wC. If the elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor in the
export sector and between land and aggregate unskilled labor in the domestic sector are
each at least one, incomes across policy regimes compare as follows:


































The comparison of family income between LF and IS is ambiguous, i.e., depending
on parameters, income can go up or down when IS are imposed.
The restriction on the elasticities of substitution in the production technologies
ensures that the unskilled wage decreases less than one-for-one with unskilled
labor supply. In this case, when IS or B are imposed the reduction in child la-
bor income is not compensated by higher adult wages, so that income declines
in families with working children. Important examples that satisfy the condi-
tions are the setup in which both production functions are Cobb Douglas, and
the nested Cobb Douglas-CES setup considered in Proposition 5. For family in-
come to increase if child labor is restricted, substitution between unskilled labor
andthe other factor (skilled labororland)would haveto behighly inelastic(close
to Leontieff) in at least one of the sectors. In our view, therefore, the empirically
plausible case is represented in the conditions and conclusions of Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 suggests that the constituency that may favor the introduction of
IS or B consists of unskilled workers with children in school, whereas those with
16working children would suffer from these policies. Thus, for a full analysis of
political incentives we also have to examine how education decisions are made.
Further, people’s political preferences will depend not only on their own wages,
but also on the wages that their children will earn in the future. Therefore, we
need to characterize the dynamic equilibria of the economy.
3.2 Long-Run Wage Effects
In this section, we analyze the long-run (i.e., steady state) implications of each
policy. We focus on economies in which, in steady state, all skilled and some of
the unskilled adults educate their children. This implies that all unskilled parents
are indifferent between educating and not educating.10 The following Bellman
equations characterize steady-state utilities and wages:
VU = wU − pU + z (π1VS + (1 − π1)VU)
= wU + wC + z (π0VS + (1 − π1)VU),
VS = wS − pS + z (π1VS + (1 − π1)VU).
These equations are the Bellman equations for skilled and unskilled workers.
There is a unique premium for skilled labor that makes unskilled workers just
indifferent between educating their children and sending them to work. The
steady state wages have to satisfy:
pU + wC = z(π1 − π0)(wS − wU + pU − pS). (4)
Intuitively, since unskilled workers are indifferent, we can evaluate the utility
of an unskilled worker under the assumption that their descendants will always
choose to educate their children. When we now compare the utility of workers
who educate their children to the utility of those who don’t, discounted expected
utility from the grandchildren’s generation onwards is independent of the ﬁrst
10In Doepke and Zilibotti (2009) we assume heterogeneity in the taste for schooling across
workers in each skill group. In that case, generically, unskilled workers are no longer indifferent
between educating and not educating their children. This alternative speciﬁcation generates the
same qualitative predictions as the model considered here.
17generation’s education choice. Thus, the indifference condition equates the op-
portunity cost of education (direct cost and forgone child-labor income) to the
short-run return, i.e., the additional wage premium and the reduction in educa-
tion cost that accrues in the next (the children’s) generation.
Let µ denote the fraction of unskilled parents who educate their children. The
laws of motion for the population are:
N
′
S =π1(NS + µNU) + π0(1 − µ)NU,
N
′
U =(1 − π1)(NS + µNU) + (1 − π0)(1 − µ)NU,
which implies the following steady-state values for the number of adult workers
(with population size normalized to one):
NU =
1 − π1
1 − (1 − µ)(π1 − π0)
NS =
π1 − (1 − µ)(π1 − π0)
1 − (1 − µ)(π1 − π0)
.
NS is strictly increasing and NU is strictly decreasing in µ. Moreover, writing
wages as a function of µ through the impact on labor supply, the left-hand side of
(4)is strictly increasing in µ and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing, because
a larger supply of skilled labor increases the return to (unskilled) child labor and
lowers the skill premium. Thus, if a solution for (4) exists, it is unique. We restrict
attention to parameters such that under LF, the steady-state µ is interior, i.e., 0 <
µLF < 1.
We now consider how steady-state labor supply and wages vary across regimes.
Proposition 7 (Steady State Comparison) In steady state, the wages across policy
































Note that even though the skill premium is highest under LF, lowest under B,
and at an intermediate level under IS, this does not imply that the fractions
of unskilled parents educating their children in each regime necessarily satisfy
µLF ≤ µIS < µB. The reason is that even without a change in µ, when IS or B are
imposed adult wages move in the required direction through the direct effect of
the withdrawal of child labor. Whether µ moves up or down when IS or B are
imposed depends on parameters. Generally, if the direct cost of education makes
up most of the opportunity cost of education, the change in the left-hand side
of the indifference condition (4) caused by a switch in the policy regime will be
small. In that case, it is possible that we observe µIS < µLF or even µB < µLF.
3.3 Summary of Political-Economy Implications
To arrive at a full assessment of the political economy of banning child labor, we
now combine our results on the short- and long-run implications of the different
policies. Wewant todetermine howthe prevailingpolicy regime (LFor IS)affects
the political incentives for introducing B. We therefore consider economies that
start out in a steady state either with LF or IS, and then (unexpectedly) introduce
B. By comparing outcomes on the transition path after B is introduced to the
outcome without a policy change, we can see who gains and who loses from the
introduction of B.
As in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), we focus on the political preferences of un-
skilled workers, because this group forms the natural constituency in favor of
a child-labor ban. Indeed, historically labor unions have been the main force
campaigning for the introduction of child-labor laws. Unskilled workers tend to
support a ban if their own children are not working (so that they are not econom-
ically dependenton child-labor income), and if introducing B promises a sizeable
rise in unskilled wages. Next, then, we need to assess how the prevailing policy
19regime determines how many unskilled workers educate their children and how
the passing of a ban affects wages.
Ifa ban on child labor isimposed, in the ﬁrst period we will observe the short-run
wage effects described in Section 3.1. Since we assume that the economy starts
out in a steady state and that the ban is introduced after education decisions are
made in the impact period, the skill composition of the population is unchanged
in the period after the ban is introduced. Hence, in the second period of the
transition path wages will be the same as in the ﬁrst. From the third period
onward, the economy attains the new steady state as described in Section 3.2.
Although the wage dynamics are relatively simple, the impact of future wage
changes on the total expected utility of workers, and hence on their political pref-
erences, is in general ambiguous. This is because there is social mobility (i.e., all
parents have both skilled and unskilled descendants with positive probability),
which implies that all adults care about both skilled and unskilled future wages.
In the following discussion, we focus on the case in which political preferences
are dominated by the short-run wage effects, i.e., people’s preferences are deter-
mined by the effect of policies on their own wages, rather than the effects on the
wages of their children, grandchildren and so on. We believe this is the relevant
case, because a period in the model corresponds to a generation in reality, im-
plying that the short run in fact is rather long (notice that the initial wage effect
persists for two periods/generations).11 In the numerical analysis of Section 3.3,
we do take explicit account of future wage changes, and ﬁnd that political pref-
erences are indeed dominated by the short-run effects.
There are two distinct channels through which the imposition of IS affects the
political economy of child-labor legislation. First, the existing policy regime de-
termines the wage changes that would result from passing a child-labor ban B.
Here our main ﬁnding is that imposing IS unambiguously lowers the potential
wage gains that adult unskilled workers can realize if they campaign for the in-
troduction of B. If light and heavy labor are highly complementary in the domes-
tic sector, imposing B once IS are in place can even lower adult unskilled wages,
11Technically, short-run wage effects dominate political preferences if the altruism factor z is
sufﬁciently small. In the simulated example presented in Section 3.3, we use z=0.3, and political
incentives are indeed aligned with the short run wage effects.
20removing those workers’ incentive for supporting B. To the extent that unskilled
workers are the main constituency that has to be mobilized in favor of a child-
labor ban, the imposition of IS thus lowers the likelihood of B being introduced.12
The second channel works through the effects of the existing policy regime on the
skill composition of the population. Political support for B generally will derive
from unskilled workers whose own children are in school, whereas unskilled
workers who depend on the income of their working children tend to oppose
a child-labor ban. There is one scenario under which imposing IS on a country
may increase the likelihood of passing a ban. The ﬁrst requirement is that even
under IS, introducing B would lead to wage gains for unskilled workers. The
second requirement is that µIS > µLF, so that under IS relatively more workers
educate their children. Under these conditions, if IS are in place there is a larger
constituency that stands to realize wage gains from the introduction of B (even
though their wage gains would be smaller compared to an initial policy regime
of LF).13
To summarize, as far as the short-run reaction of wages is concerned, imposing
IS generally reduces the likelihood that a ban will be introduced. In contrast,
the effect of IS on the skill composition of the population is ambiguous: under
certain circumstances IS may make the introduction of B more likely. But in our
view this positive effect is unlikely to be empirically relevant, because we have
made some simplifying assumptions that bias the results in favor of generating
a positive effect of IS on education. In our model, the decision of whether to
educate a child depends only on the skill premium and the opportunity cost of
education, but not on total family income. In a richer model (incorporating for
example ﬁnancial frictions, subsistence consumption constraints, or strongly di-
12As documented by Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), working-class unions usually were the main
force behind the introduction of child-labor restrictions in industrialized countries, which is con-
sistent with our emphasis on the preferencesof unskilled workers. However, it should be pointed
out that if under IS the introduction of B would lower unskilled wages, it would necessarily raise
skilled wages, which creates a potential alternative constituency for B.
13Although we have not speciﬁed a political mechanism that translates voters’ preferences and
the composition of the population into a particular political outcome, there are a number of po-
litical mechanisms (such as majority voting) that would imply a speciﬁc threshold ¯ µ that needs
to be passed for political support for B to be sufﬁcient. If we have µLF < ¯ µ < µIS, imposing IS
could be the nudge that leads to the ultimate adoption of B.
21minishing marginal utility), additional income effects would arise. The empirical
literature (see the discussion in the introduction) suggests that families on the
margin between education and child labor often are ﬁnancially constrained. In
such families, child-labor income derived from some of the children can be cru-
cial for sending other children to school. Given that IS lower child-labor income,
after IS are imposed such families may no longer be able to afford educating any
of the children, even though IS lowers the opportunity cost of education. Thus, a
richer modeling framework including income effects would reinforce our overall
argument that imposing labor standards or trade sanctions lowers the prospects
for comprehensive child-labor regulation.
4 Technological Change and the Dynamic Effects of
International Labor Standards
So far, we have focused on the political economy of child-labor regulation in a
stationary environment, i.e., the parameters of the production technologies were
assumed to be constant over time. The argument could be made that imposing IS
on a stationary economy with high child labor rates in the steady state cannot do
any harm. If the parameters of the economy were such that there was sufﬁcient
political support for a child-labor ban, the country would have introduced B al-
ready. If, in contrast, LF prevails in steady state and child labor rates are positive,
political support for B evidently is insufﬁcient even before the introduction of IS.
Imposing IS on a stationary economy, then, should not affect the adoption of B.
In this section, we demonstrate that this argument breaks down if the economy
undergoes technological change that increases the demand for skilled labor. We
provide a dynamic simulation of an economy that initially is in a steady state
where there is insufﬁcient support for the introduction of B, and where a sub-
stantial fraction of children are working. Over time, however, the productivity of
the export sector increases relative to the domestic sector’s. This change increases
the demand for skilled labor. Thus, a larger fraction of unskilled workers choose
to educate their children, which swells the constituency that stands to gain from
22the introduction of a child-labor ban. We show that in this environment, the im-
position of IS on the country can prevent the ultimate eradication of child labor.
Parameter Interpretation Value
L Amount of land 1
α Total share of labor in D sector 0.8
β Relative share of light labor in D sector 0.066
γ Share of light labor in E sector 0.25
π1 Fraction of educated children becoming skilled adults 0.7
π0 Fraction of working children becoming skilled adults 0
z Altruism factor 0.3
pS Cost of education for skilled parents 0.025
pU Cost of education for unskilled parents 0.075
AE,0 Initial productivity of E sector 2.5
g Growth rate of productivity of E sector 0.0075
Table 1: Parameter Values for Simulated Economy
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values that were used for the simulation. Both
































The productivity of the export sector increases at a constant rate every period:
AE,t+1 = (1 + g)AE,t.
The initial conditions for the economy (i.e., the numbers of skilled and unskilled
adults in the initial period, NS,0 and NU,0) were chosen as the steady-state values
corresponding to the initial productivity of the export sector AE,0.
We assume that introducing B in the country requires the support of a majority
of the unskilled adults. As in Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), the interpretation of






























Figure 1: Unskilled Adult Wages under Different Policies
this assumption is that B is passed once labor unions (who represent unskilled
workers) campaign for the eradication of child labor.14 In the initial period, the
preferences of the different types of workers (taking account of the full dynastic
utility asafunction ofcurrent andfuture wages)line up asin our theoretical anal-
ysis above: skilled workers as well as unskilled workers with working children
oppose B, whereas unskilled workers whose children receive education favor the
introduction of B.
In the initial period, about 45 percent of unskilled parents educate their children,
which implies that there is insufﬁcient political support for the introduction of B.
Over time, however, the rising productivity of the export sector (which is in-
tensive in skilled labor) induces more and more unskilled parents educate their
children, which increases the constituency that stands to gain from B. In period 5,
for the ﬁrst time more than 50 percent of unskilled parents educate their children.
These workers can increase their utility by forcing the introduction of B, and con-
14It is possible to construct similar examples in which B is passed once a majority of all adults
support the reform.























Figure 2: Children’s Wages under Different Policies






























Figure 3: Child Labor Rate under Different Policies
25sequently from period 5 onward, child labor is banned.15
Figures 1 to 3 display the implications of technological change and the introduc-
tion of B for the wages of unskilled adults, the wages of children, and the child
labor rate. Under LF (dotted line), unskilled and child wages rise slowly over
time (due to technological progress), and the child labor rate declines (due to
increasing education). The introduction of B in period 5 (solid line, “LF to B”)
immediately reduces child wages and the child labor rate to zero. In periods 5
and 6, there is a moderate increase in unskilled wages. From period 7 onward,
unskilled wages increase by a larger amount. This second increase results from a
bigger supply of skilled labor: the elimination of child labor reduces the opportu-
nity cost of education, and therefore leads to a lower equilibrium skill premium.
So, even though the economy starts out in LF with a relatively high child la-
bor rate, if left to its own devices the country ultimately bans child labor. The
abolishment of child labor leads to a substantial rise in education and a large
improvement in the living standards of unskilled workers.
Let us compare this outcome to an alternative scenario in which the international
community imposes IS before the threshold for the introduction of B is reached.
Figures 1 to 3 display outcomes if IS are imposed in period 2 (dashed line, “IS”).
In the short term, this intervention reduces child wages, increases unskilled adult
wages, and lowers the child labor rate. Compared to the outcome under LF
up until period 4, the IS policy may be deemed successful in terms of ﬁghting
child labor and improving the wages of unskilled workers. However, in period 5
(when B would be introduced if IS were not in place) there is little political sup-
port for introducing B. In fact, introducing B in the economy that already has IS
in place would reduce unskilled wages in the short term. Thus, once IS are in
place, the economy no longer introduces B.
Comparing the outcome under IS (dashed line) to the one under the endogenous
introduction of B (solid line), we see that IS in fact lead to more child labor and
15For simplicity, and consistent with our theoretical analysis above, we assume that the in-
troduction of B in period 5 is unanticipated. Education decisions therefore change only from
period 6 onward. Under perfect foresight of future policies, the overall dynamics and the effects
of imposing IS would be qualitatively unchanged, but there would be additional anticipation
effects.
26lower unskilled wages in the long run. If the economy were left alone, child labor
would be eliminated from period 5 onward. If IS are imposed, the child labor
rate declines only gradually, and remains above 10 percent throughout the entire
transition. In addition, the endogenous introduction of B yields a long-run rise in
the unskilled wage that is almost twice the increase caused by the imposition of
IS. Thus, the simulation shows that the imposition of IS can prevent the ultimate
eradication of child labor and can lead to lower living standards for unskilled
workers.
5 Conclusions
Our analysis raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of international labor
standards and trade sanctions in addressing the child-labor problem in devel-
oping countries. We ﬁnd that these measures not only reduce the income and
welfare of developing countries in the short run, but also have the potential to
lower the prospects for the ultimate eradication of child labor through domestic
political action.
Given these ﬁndings, a natural question is whether there are alternative policies
that the international community could implement to ﬁght child labor. As a the-
oretical exercise, it is easy to come up with policy proposals that would be more
productive than the international labor standards considered in our model. For
example, a policy could punish developing countries for the use of child labor
anywhere in the economy, not just in the export sector. Even more effectively,
one could construct a policy that punishes the use of child labor in the domestic
sector, while leaving child labor unconstrained in the export sector. In our model,
this would place children in the sector where they compete directly with adults,
increasing the incentives of unskilled workers to vote for a ban on child labor.
These alternative policy proposals, however, may not be feasible or even desir-
able to put into practice. The use of child labor would have to be strictly mon-
itored, for example, in the informal sector or in family farming. Ensuring com-
pliance at this level would be very difﬁcult, especially if developing countries
27chose not to cooperate. Equally signiﬁcant is the issue of welfare. Even if child
labor could be wiped out by tight monitoring in every sector and by punish-
ing its use where detected, families in developing countries would experience
large income losses. The compensating beneﬁts could not be guaranteed unless
the now-unemployed children were re-engaged in worthwhile ways, schooling
in particular. Social policies targeting the poor, then, may well be a necessary
complement to ending the use of child labor.
An important caveat is that our analysis focuses on conditions that give rise to
majority support for a child-labor ban among unskilled workers. Implicitly, we
assume that the working class has enough political inﬂuence to make their views
pivotal. This assumption is grounded in the observation that in developed coun-
tries, labor unions were often the main campaigners for child labor laws. Further,
in many countries with widespread child labor we observe that unions represent-
ing unskilled workers oppose child-labor regulation. For instance, Weiner (1991)
argues that in India there is no political pressure from trade unions to ban child
labor, since the ban would be unpopular among the majority of poor workers.
But political institutions differ across countries, and in many developing coun-
tries unions are weak. In these countries, even if a majority of workers would
beneﬁt from a child-labor ban, the local business lobby may be able to prevent
regulation through its inﬂuence on the political process. In this scenario, interna-
tional pressure maystrengthen the caseofgroups thatfavoraban. Eventhen, our
analysis suggests that the external pressure should not speciﬁcally target child la-
bor in the export sector.
For the international community, a more productive approach might be to move
away from sanctions to policies that promote alternatives to child labor.16 Re-
cently, some developing countries have had real success with programs that re-
ward parents for keeping their children in school (the most prominent examples
are PROGRESA in Mexico and Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Familia in Brazil). Programs
16It is useful to keep in mind that abolishing child labor is not an end in itself, but has to be
justiﬁed with the welfare implications for families and their children. Since we believe that child
labor is harmful mostly because it keeps children out of school, policies should focus on the ulti-
mate objective of increasing education rather than exclusively on the sole aim of lowering child
labor. See Doepke and Krueger (2006) for a comprehensive discussion of child-labor regulation
and related policies from a welfare perspective.
28like these are inducing more families to educate their children rather than relying
on child labor, strengthening the constituency that stands to gain from child labor
laws. Moreover, policies promoting education do not lead to a displacement of
working children into low-productivity tasks that are complementary to adult la-
bor, as do international labor standards and trade sanctions. Our earlier research
(Doepke and Zilibotti 2005) also suggests that fertility is an important determi-
nant of child labor. Large families typically are opposed to banning child labor,
as these are more dependent on child labor income. Policies promoting consci-
entious family planning also can build the constituency favoring child-labor reg-
ulation. A reworking of international policy measures along these lines should
improve the prospects for reducing child labor in developing countries.
29A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Proﬁt maximization implies that wages equal marginal products










Given that we assume that unskilled workers supply both types of unskilled labor, the
returns to light and heavy labor have to be equalized, both within and across sectors.


































Finally, given that the use of child labor is unrestricted, the children’s wages are given by























Proof of Proposition 2: Consider ﬁrst the case in which IS are non-binding, i.e., Condi-








C,E. Given that IS are imposed, we must have θIS
C,E = 0. To








Condition (1) ensures that
θIS
U,E ≤ 1,
implying that the choice is feasible. To keep the supply of heavy labor in the domestic






Condition (1) ensures that
θIS
U,D ≥ 0,
implying that the choice is feasible. The resulting supply of light unskilled labor in the
30domestic sector is:
θIS





















U,DNU + (1 − θLF
C,E)λNC.
Thus, labor supply is once again identical to LF, implying that all wages are the same as
well.
Now consider the case where IS are binding, i.e., Condition (2) holds. The condition
implies that the supply of light labor in the domestic sector rises above what is supplied
under LF. Thus, wages can no longer be equalized, so that no adults will supply light
labor to the domestic sector, implying θIS










Thus, total unskilled labor supplied to the export sector and to heavy labor in the domes-
tic sectorhas to decline relative to LF.The ratios of skilled to unskilled labor supplyin the
export sector and of light to heavy labor in the domestic sector therefore rise compared







































Proof of Proposition 3: Under a child-labor ban the total supply of unskilled labor de-
clines unambiguously. To equalize wages across sectors, the supply of unskilled labor
then also has to decline in each sector individually. The ratios of skilled to unskilled
labor supply in the export sector and of land to unskilled labor supply in the domestic











































Proof of Proposition 4: The results are implied by Propositions 2 and 3. 2
31Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the case in which the export technology is Cobb Dou-
glas, and the domestic production function is a nested Cobb Douglas-CES technology:
Y E = S1−γ(UE
l )γ,
Y D = L1−α
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We now want to compare wages for unskilled workers under IS and B. For signing the
wage effects, it is sufﬁcient to focus on the determination of wages in the domestic sector.
In particular, we are going to ask what happens to adult unskilled wages in the domestic
sector after removing the children and keeping constant the number of unskilled adults
intheD sector. Eventhoughthe fullequilibrium will generallyalso involve areallocation
of adult labor between the E and D sectors, this reallocation can only mitigate the wage
effect with the labor allocation held constant, but cannot reverse it. Let N
D,IS
U denote the
total number of unskilled adults working in the domestic sector under IS, and NIS
C is the
correspondingnumberof child workers. Ifnow B is imposedand adult labor allocated to




U ), the constant adult labor will be allocated







































We can therefore rewrite the production function under B as:






























32In contrast, under IS we have:

















































which is the condition stated in the proposition. 2
Proof of Corollary 1: The result follows from the wage comparisons in Proposition 4. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: Given the assumption of constant returns, the production func-











































































for all x > 0.








U,E denote the fractions of total unskilled labor (including adult and child
labor) devoted to the export sector and light labor in the domestic sector under LF. These










U,DNU + λ(1 − θLF
C,E)NC
NU + λNC
Also, total unskilled labor supply under LF is:
NU + λNC = (1 + (1 − µ)λ)NU.
Since wages to unskilled labor are equalized across sectorsand types of labor, the income
of unskilled families under LF can be expressed in three different ways. For example,





U,E(1 + (1 − µ)λ)NU
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l (λ) ≡ (1 + λ)
 










U,D(1 + (1 − µ)λ)NU,(1 − νLF
U,E − νLF


















income can also be linked to the return to heavy and light labor in the domestic sector:
ID




















l (λ) = ID
l (λ) = ID
h (λ).
Moving theeconomy from LF to B amounts settingλ = 0. One feasible adjustmentto this
change (but not necessarily the optimal one) would reduce each use of unskilled labor
(light labor in the export sector, and heavy and light labor in the domesticsector)in equal




h (0) that would result from this adjustment using each use of unskilled labor to pin
down the unskilled wage. Even though reducing labor proportionally is not necessarily



















Intuitively, taking the proportional reduction of labor supply in each use as a starting
point, any reallocation of labor across uses can only increase the return to one use of
unskilled labor at the expense of another. Since in equilibrium returns to each use of
unskilled labor are equalized, the equilibrium return has to lie within the range spanned











l (λ) = ID
l (λ) = ID
h (λ).
This relationship, in turn, can be established by showing that IE
l (λ), ID
l (λ), and ID
h (λ)
are each strictly decreasing in λ. Consider, ﬁrst, the use of unskilled labor in the export





Writing out this equation gives (here we write x for x(λ) for more compact notation):
fE (x) − xf′
E (x) +
(1 + λ)(1 − µ)
1 + (1 − µ)λ
x2f′′
E (x) > 0.
Modifying the condition to be comparable to (5) gives:
−
f′







The numerator is identical to that in (5), and in the denominator we have that:
(1 + λ)(1 − µ)
1 + (1 − µ)λ
< 1
and xf′
E(x) ≤ fE(x) due to the assumption of diminishing marginal products. The de-














which together with (5) implies the desired inequality.





Writing out and modifying this inequality as above gives:
g′(y)
 
fD (x) − xf′
D (x) +
(1 + λ)(1 − µ)














Parallel to the case above, this inequality is implied by (6). Following the same steps, we











We still need to determine the income of families with working children under IS relative
to LF and B. If IS are nonbinding (i.e., Condition (1) is satisﬁed), wages and incomes are
as under LF, and the previous result applies. Consider, therefore the case in which IS are






If we have wB
U ≤ wIS
U , the result follows immediately, because wB
C = 0 < wIS
C . Hence,
from here on we will focus on the case wB
U > wIS
U . First, notice that the ratio of marginal




















If IS are binding (which is the case we are considering here), the marginal product of
heavy labor exceeds the marginal product of light labor in the domestic sector. In con-








36This equation implies yB > yIS because of the concavity of g. Next, consider the de-
termination of the unskilled wage. Based on the return to heavy labor in the domestic









U (the case that we consider here), we must have:
xB > xIS.
This is because the fact that yB > yIS tends to lower the unskilled wage, which has to be
offset by a higher input ratio of land versus aggregated unskilled labor.
Consider now the total income accruing to unskilled labor (provided by both adults and













































We now would like to show that the share of unskilled labor in total domestic output is
























which is (6) and therefore satisﬁed.
Given that xB > xIS, the result implies that total unskilled income on the domestic
sector has to be lower under B than under IS, since under B unskilled labor derives at
37most an unchanged share of a smaller total amount of output. In the export sector, total
unskilled income has to be smaller as well. The increase in the unskilled wage implies
that less adult unskilled labor is employed in this sector under B compared to IS. Given
our assumption of an elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor of at
least one, the share of unskilled labor in the output of the export sector cannot be larger
under B compared to IS, so that total income accruing to unskilled labor in the export
sector has to decline once B is imposed.
To summarize, total income derived by unskilled families declines in both sectors and
thus also in the aggregate. In addition, unskilled families with working children derive a
relatively smaller share of total unskilled income under B compared to IS (because under
IS their families supply more labor than do families with children in school, whereas
under B all families supply one unit of adult labor only). These families therefore claim a







Proof of Proposition 7: Consider ﬁrst the comparison of wages under LF and IS. In
either case, the indifference condition determining the skill premium is given by (4). If
IS are non-binding, clearly wages are the same under LF and IS. Consider, therefore,
the case in which IS are binding. First we would like to show that if IS are binding,
the child wage has to be strictly smaller under IS than under LF. We show this by a
contradiction argument. Assume, to the contrary, that wLF
C ≤ wIS
C . Given that for a
ﬁxed adult labor supply we have wLF
C > wIS
C (Proposition 4), this is only possible if
µLF < µIS, i.e., ifunderISunskilledlabor isrelatively morescarce. However,thuswould




U . Comparing the indifference condition (4)
across regimes, going from LF to IS we would observe an increase in the opportunity
cost of education (left-hand side) but a decline in the return to education (right-hand
side). Thus, wLF
C ≤ wIS
C implies that the indifference condition (4) cannot be satisﬁed
for both LF and IS. We therefore obtain a contradiction, and conclude that wLF
C > wIS
C .






Going from IS to B, the child wage is reduced to zero, wB
C = 0. The left-hand side of
the indifference condition (4) therefore decreases even further, implying that the skill
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